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Chapter 1
Classical physics on a ﬁnite phase space
Throughout this chapter, X is a ﬁnite set, playing the role of the conﬁguration space
of some physical system, or, equivalently (as we shall see), of its pure state space (in
the continuous case, X will be the phase space rather than the conﬁguration space).
One should not frown upon ﬁnite sets: for example, the conﬁguration space of N
bits is given by X = 2N , where for arbitrary sets Y and Z, the set YZ consists of all
functions x : Z → Y , and for any N ∈ N we write N = {1,2, . . . ,N} (although, fol-
lowing the computer scientists, 2 usually denotes {0,1}). More generally, if one has
a lattice Λ ⊂Zd and each site is the home of some classical object (say a “spin”) that
may assume N different conﬁgurations, then X = NΛ , in that x : Λ → N describes
the conﬁguration in which the “spin” at site n ∈Λ takes the value x(n) ∈ N.
Although the setting is a priori deterministic, in that (knowing) some point x ∈
X in its guise as a pure state at least in principle determines everything (there is
to say), the mathematical language will be probabilistic. Even within the conﬁnes
of classicality this allows one to do statistical physics, and as such it also sheds
light on e.g. the special status of x as an extreme probability measure (see below).
Furthermore, the use of this language may be motivated by the goal of describing
classical and quantum mechanics as analogously as possible at this elementary level.
The following concepts play a central role in this chapter. Recall that the power
setP(X) of X is the set of all subsets of X (for ﬁnite X , these are all measurable).
Deﬁnition 1.1. 1. An event is a subset U ⊆ X, i.e., U ∈P(X).
2. A probability distribution on X is a function p :X → [0,1] such that∑x p(x)= 1.
3. A probability measure on X is a function P :P(X)→ [0,1] such that P(X) = 1
and P(U ∪V ) = P(U)+P(V ) whenever U ∩V = /0.
4. For a given probability measure P on X, and an event V ⊆ X such that P(V )> 0,
the conditional probability P(U |V ) of U given V is deﬁned by
P(U |V ) = P(U ∩V )
P(V )
. (1.1)
5. A random variable on X is a function f : X → R.
6. The spectrum of a random variable f is the subset σ( f ) = { f (x) | x ∈ X} of R.
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1.1 Basic constructions of probability theory
Probability distributions p and probability measures P determine each other by
P(U) = ∑
x∈U
p(x); (1.2)
p(x) = P({x}), (1.3)
but this is peculiar to ﬁnite sets (in general, probability measures will be primary).
Two special classes of probability measures and of random variables stand out:
• Each y ∈ X deﬁnes a probability distribution py by py(x) = δxy, or explicitly
py(x) = 1 if x = y and py(x) = 0 if x = y; for the corresponding probability
measure one has Py(U) = 1 if y ∈U and Py(U) = 0 if y /∈U .
• Each eventU ⊂ X deﬁnes a random variable 1U (i.e., the characteristic function
of U) by 1U (x) = 1 if x ∈U and 1U (x) = 0 if x /∈U . Clearly, σ(1U ) = {0} when
U = /0, σ(1U ) = {1} when U = X , and σ(1U ) = {0,1} otherwise. Note that
1U (x) = Px(U). Conversely, any random variable f with spectrum σ( f )⊆ {0,1}
is given by f = 1U for some U ⊆ X ; just take U = {x ∈ X | f (x) = 1}. Such
functions may be construed as yes-no questions to the system (i.e. f = 1 versus
f = 0) and will lie at the basis of the logical interpretation of the theory (cf. §1.4).
The single most important construction in probability theory is as follows.
Theorem 1.2. A probability distribution p on X and a random variable f : X → R
jointly yield a probability distribution p f on the spectrum σ( f ) by means of
p f (λ ) = ∑
x∈X | f (x)=λ
p(x). (1.4)
In terms of the corresponding probability measure P on X, one has
p f (λ ) = P( f = λ ), (1.5)
where f = λ denotes the event {x ∈ X | f (x) = λ} in X. Similarly, the probability
measure Pf on σ( f ) corresponding to the probability distribution p f is given by
Pf (Δ) = P( f ∈ Δ), (1.6)
where Δ ⊆ σ( f ) and f ∈ Δ denotes the event {x ∈ X | f (x) ∈ Δ} in X.
The proof is trivial. Instead of f = λ , the notation f−1({λ}) might be used, and
similarly, f−1(Δ) is the same as f ∈ Δ . If λ ∈ σ( f ) is non-degenerate in that there
is exactly one xλ ∈ X such that f (xλ ) = λ , then one simply has P( f = λ ) = p(xλ ).
For example, combining both our special cases P= Py and f = 1U above yields
Py(1U = 1) = 1 and Py(1U = 0) = 0 if y ∈U ; (1.7)
Py(1U = 1) = 0 and Py(1U = 0) = 1 if y /∈U. (1.8)
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Given some probability measure P, the expectation value EP( f ) and the variance
ΔP( f ) of a random variable f with respect to P are deﬁned by, respectively,
EP( f ) = ∑
x∈X
f (x)p(x); (1.9)
ΔP( f ) = EP( f 2)−EP( f )2. (1.10)
A simple calculation shows that EP may be written directly in terms of P itself as
EP( f ) = ∑
λ∈σ( f )
P( f = λ ) ·λ . (1.11)
Note that ΔP( f )≥ 0. The special role of the point measures Py may now be clariﬁed:
Proposition 1.3. A probability measure P takes the form P = Py for some y ∈ X iff
ΔP( f ) = 0 for all random variables f : X → R.
Proof. For “⇒”, we compute EPy( f ) = f (y), and hence EPy( f 2) = f (y)2. In the
opposite direction, take f = py, so that f 2 = f and hence ΔP( f ) = p(y)− p(y)2.
The assumption ΔP( f ) = 0 for each f implies that either p(y) = 0 or p(y) = 1 for
each y ∈ X . Deﬁnition 1.1.2 then implies that p(y) = 1 for exactly one y ∈ X . 
More generally, a collection f1, . . . , fn of n random variables and a (single) prob-
ability distribution p on X jointly deﬁne a probability distribution p f1,..., fn on the
product σ( f1)×·· ·×σ( fn) of the individual spectra by
p f1... fn(λ1, . . . ,λn) = ∑
x∈X | f1(x)=λ1,..., fn(x)=λn
p(x). (1.12)
Once again, this may be rewritten as
p f1... fn(λ1, . . . ,λn) = P( f1 = λ1, . . . , fn = λn), (1.13)
where the argument of P denotes the intersection ∩nk=1( fk = λk), i.e.,
P( f1 = λ1, . . . , fn = λn) = {x ∈ X | f1(x) = λ1, . . . , fn(x) = λn}. (1.14)
Simple calculations then yield results for the so-called marginal distributions, like
∑
λl+1∈σ( fl+1),...,λn∈σ( fn)
P( f1 = λ1, . . . , fn = λn) = P( f1 = λ1, . . . , fl = λl), (1.15)
where 1 ≤ l < n. The above constructions also apply to the corresponding condi-
tional probabilities: given m additional random variables a1, . . . ,am, one has
∑
λl+1∈σ( fl+1),...,λn∈σ( fn)
P( f1 = λ1, . . . , fn = λn|a1 = α1, . . .am = αm) (1.16)
= P( f1 = λ1, . . . , fl = λl |a1 = α1, . . .am = αm). (1.17)
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1.2 Classical observables and states
Given a ﬁnite set X , we may form the set C(X) of all complex-valued functions on
X , enriched with the structure of a complex vector space under pointwise operations:
(λ · f )(x) = λ f (x) (λ ∈ C); (1.18)
( f +g)(x) = f (x)+g(x). (1.19)
We use the notation C(X) with some foresight, anticipating the case where X is no
longer ﬁnite, but in any case, since for the moment it is, every function is contin-
uous. Moreover, the vector space structure on C(X) may be extended to that of a
commutative algebra (where, by convention, all our algebras are associative and are
deﬁned over the complex scalars) by deﬁning multiplication pointwisely, too:
( f ·g)(x) = f (x)g(x). (1.20)
Note that this algebra has a unit 1X , i.e., the function identically equal to 1.
For ﬁnite X , this structure sufﬁces for X to be recovered from C(X), as follows.
Deﬁnition 1.4. The Gelfand spectrum Σ(A) of a (complex) algebra A is the set of
all nonzero linear maps ω : A→ C that satisfy ω( f g) = ω( f )ω(g).
These are, of course, precisely the nonzero algebra homomorphisms from A to C.
Proposition 1.5. The Gelfand spectrum Σ(C(X)) is isomorphic (as a set) to X.
Proof. Each x ∈ X deﬁnes a map ωx : C(X)→ C by ωx( f ) = f (x). One obviously
has ωx ∈ Σ(C(X)), so we have a map X → Σ(C(X)), x →ωx. We show that this map
is a bijection. Injectivity is easy: if ωx = ωy, then f (x) = f (y) for each f ∈ C(X),
so taking f = δz for each z ∈ X gives x= y (here δz(x) = δxz). To prove surjectivity,
we note that since C(X) is ﬁnite-dimensional as a vector space, with basis (δy)y∈X ,
each linear functional ω :C(X)→ C takes the form
ω( f ) =∑
x
μ(x) f (x), (1.21)
for some function μ : X →C. For ω ∈ Σ(C(X)), ﬁnd some z∈ X for which μ(z) = 0
(this has to exist, as ω = 0). For arbitrary w ∈ X , imposing ω(δwδz) = ω(δw)ω(δz)
enforces μ = δz (which also shows that z is unique), and hence ω = ωz. 
The physically relevant set R(X) of all real-valued functions on X is obviously
a real vector space inside C(X). To recover it algebraically, we equip C(X) with an
involution, which on an arbitrary (not necessarily commutative) algebra A is deﬁned
as an anti-linear anti-homomorphism that squares to idA, i.e., a linear map ∗ : A→ A
(written a → a∗) that satisﬁes (λa)∗ = λa∗, (ab)∗ = b∗a∗, and a∗∗ = a. In our case
A=C(X), which is commutative, the latter property simply becomes ( f g)∗ = f ∗g∗.
In any case, we deﬁne this involution by pointwise complex conjugation, i.e.,
f ∗(x) = f (x). (1.22)
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We evidently recover the real-valued functions in the involutive algebra C(X) as
R(X)≡C(X)sa = { f ∈C(X) | f ∗ = f}. (1.23)
Finally, although we do not need this yet, we note that C(X) has a natural norm
‖ f‖∞ = sup
x∈X
{| f (x)|}. (1.24)
These structures turn C(X) into a commutative C*-algebra (cf. Deﬁnition C.1).
Deﬁnition 1.6. The algebra of observables of the physical system described by the
phase space X is C(X), seen as a (commutative) C*-algebra in the above way.
Thence elements ofC(X) are called observables (a term that really should be applied
only to its self-adjoint elements, i.e., those satisfying f ∗ = f ).
We have thus equipped the random variables on X with enough structure to re-
cover X itself, and now turn to the other side of the coin, viz. the probability mea-
sures on X . Here the relevant mathematical structure is that of a compact convex set,
a concept we only need to deﬁne in the context of an ambient (real) vector space.
Deﬁnition 1.7. A subset K of a (real or complex) vector space V is called convex if
the straight line segment between any two points on K lies in K. Expressed formally,
this means that whenever v,w ∈ K and t ∈ (0,1), one has tv+(1− t)w ∈ K.
The following probabilistic reformulation of this notion is very useful.
Proposition 1.8. A set K ⊂V is convex iff for any k, given k probabilities (t1, . . . , tk)
(i.e., ti ≥ 0 and ∑i ti = 1) and k points (v1, . . . ,vk) in K, one has ∑ki=1 ti · vi ∈ K.
Proof. Taking k = 2 recovers Deﬁnition 1.7 from its probabilistic version. Con-
versely, one uses induction on k, using the identity (assuming 0 < tk < 1):
t1v1+ · · ·+ tkvk = (1− tk)
(
t1
1− tk v1+ · · ·+
tk−1
1− tk vk−1
)
+ tkvk. 
Any linear subspace of V is trivially convex, as is any translate thereof (i.e., any
afﬁne subspace of V ). Another, much more important example is the convex hull
co(S) of any subset S ⊂V ; noting that the intersection of any family of convex sets
is again convex, co(S) may be deﬁned as the intersection of all convex subsets of V
that contain S, or, equivalently, as the smallest convex subset of V that contains S
(whose existence is guaranteed by the previous remark). Proposition 1.8 then yields
co(S) =
{
k
∑
i=1
ti · vi | k ∈ N,(v1, . . . ,vk) ∈ Sk, ti ≥ 0,∑
i
ti = 1
}
. (1.25)
In particular, if S = {v1, . . . ,vk} is a ﬁnite set, then one simply has
co({v1, . . . ,vk}) =
{
k
∑
i=1
ti · vi | ti ≥ 0,∑
i
ti = 1
}
. (1.26)
28 1 Classical physics on a ﬁnite phase space
The convex hull of any ﬁnite set of points in Rn+1 is called a convex polytope. Such
convex sets are closed and bounded (since none of the ti ≥ 0 can walk away too far
without violating the condition ∑i ti = 1), and hence are compact. In particular,
Δn = {x ∈ Rn+1 | xi ≥ 0,∑
i
xi = 1} (1.27)
is a convex polytope called a simplex. For example, Δ1 is the line segment from
(0,1) to (1,0) inR2. We would like to say that Δ1 is “isomorphic” to the unit interval
[0,1], so we deﬁne two convex sets K1,K2 to be isomorphic (as such) if there is a
bijection f : K1 → K2 that is afﬁne, in that for t ∈ (0,1) and v1,v2 ∈ K1, we have
f (tv1+(1− t)v2) = t f (v1)+(1− t) f (v2). (1.28)
Then the function f : Δ1 → [0,1] given by f (λ ,1−λ ) = λ , where λ ∈ [0,1], will do.
Similarly, Δ2 ⊂ R3 is isomorphic to any equilateral triangle in R2 with sides of unit
length, whereas Δ3 is just the tetrahedron (which is one of the ﬁve Platonic solids).
There are many other convex polytopes (cf. §B.11), but simplices are of prime
importance for us, since Δn is isomorphic to the set Pr(X) of all probability distribu-
tions on a set X = {0, . . . ,n}with n+1 points; the identiﬁcation Pr(X) p↔ x∈ Δn
is given by xi = p(i+ 1). In particular, we see that for any ﬁnite set X , Pr(X) is a
compact convex set. This is also clear from Deﬁnitions 1.1 and 1.7 (and will even
be true for general compact phase spaces X , cf. Corollary B.17 and §C.25).
Deﬁnition 1.9. The state space of the physical system described by a (ﬁnite) space
X is the set Pr(X) of all probability measures on X (or, equivalently, of all probability
distributions on X), seen as a compact convex set.
Thus a probability measure (or distribution) on X is often called a state (of the
physical system described by X). The operation of passing from states P,Q ∈ Pr(X)
to a new state tP+(1− t)Q ∈ Pr(X), where t ∈ (0,1) as usual, or, more generally,
from a (ﬁnite) family of states (Pi) and a set (ti) of probabilities (i.e., ti ≥ 0 and
∑i ti = 1) to the convex sum ∑i tiPi, is called mixing.
It is possible to recover X from its associated state space Pr(X), as follows.
Deﬁnition 1.10. The (extreme) boundary ∂eK of a convex set K consists of all
points v ∈ K satisfying the following condition:
if v= tw+(1− t)x for certain w,x ∈ K and t ∈ (0,1), then v= w= x.
Elements v ∈ ∂eK of the boundary are called extreme points of K.
We will now compute the boundary of Pr(X). The result may be expressed by
∂eΔn = {e1, . . . .en+1}, (1.29)
where (e1, . . . .en+1) is the standard basis of Rn+1 (i.e., e1 = (1,0, . . . ,0), etc.). How-
ever, we will give a direct probabilistic proof. We already noted the special proba-
bility measures Px, x ∈ X . The association x → Px deﬁnes a map from X to Pr(X).
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Proposition 1.11. The set X is isomorphic to the boundary ∂ePr(X) through x → Px.
Proof. It is convenient to work with probability distributions p rather than prob-
ability measures P. First, x → px is trivially injective from X to Pr(X): if x = y
then px(x) = 1 whereas py(x) = 0, so px = py. Second, px ∈ ∂ePr(X). For sup-
pose one has px = t p+ (1− t)q for some p,q ∈ Pr(X) and t ∈ (0,1). Hence
px(y) = t p(y)+(1−t)q(y). Taking y = x yields p(y) = q(y) = 0, so that p= q= px.
Consequently, X ⊆ ∂ePr(X).
The converse inclusion is (contrapositively) equivalent to the property that for
any p = px (for all x), there are q and r, q = r, and t ∈ (0,1), with p= tq+(1− t)r.
Indeed, if p = px, there is some x0 ∈ X with 0 < p(x0) < 1. Now deﬁne q, r, and t
by q(x0) = 1 and q(x) = 0 for all x = x0, r(x0) = 0 and r(x) = p(x)/(1− p(x0)), and
ﬁnally t = p(x0). Then p= tq+(1− t)r and q = r. 
The simplest example would be X = {0,1}, so that Pr(X) ∼= [0,1] by mapping the
distribution p ∈ Pr(X) to p(1). Since one may directly verify that ∂e[0,1] = {0,1},
under the above isomorphism one therefore has ∂ePr(X) ∼= {0,1}. Analogously,
∂e(0,1) = /0, so that the boundary of a convex set may apparently be empty. Hence
we see that one remarkable ingredient of Proposition 1.11 lies in the claim that the
convex set Pr(X) actually has a (nonempty) boundary! This is no accident: by the
Krein-Milman Theorem (cf. §B.10), this is true for any compact convex set (which
is consistent with the counterexample just given). For example in quantum mechan-
ics we will encounter the case of K = B3 (i.e. the closed unit ball in R3) as the state
space of a qubit, whose (extreme) boundary is the two-sphere S2, cf. Proposition
2.9. Something similar is true in any dimension, but beware of surprises: if K = Δ2
is an equilateral triangle in the plane, then its extreme boundary ∂eK consists of the
vertices of K (whereas its faces form the geometric boundary of the triangle).
The general problem arises whether some point v ∈ K of a compact convex set K
may be written as a convex sum (or, more generally, an integral) of extreme points
of K, and if so, to what extent this extremal decomposition
v=∑
i∈I
tivi, ti ≥ 0,∑
i
ti = 1, vi ∈ ∂eK, (1.30)
which for simplicity has been assumed to be a ﬁnite sum here, is unique. Without
proof, we state a general result of convexity theory, called Caratheodory’s Theorem:
Theorem 1.12. If K is a nonempty compact convex subset of Rn, then ∂eK = /0, and
each point of K is a convex sum of at most n+1 points in ∂eK.
If K = Δn, then this sum generically has n+1 points and is unique. Probabilistically:
Proposition 1.13. If X is ﬁnite, then any probability measure P ∈ Pr(X) may be
written in a unique way as a ﬁnite mixture of extreme probability measures, viz.
P= ∑
x∈X
txPx. (1.31)
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Proof. Take tx = P({x}) in the sense of Deﬁnition 1.1, or, equivalently, tx = EP(δx)
in the sense of (1.9). To see that this decomposition is unique, use Proposition 1.11,
i.e. ∂ePr(X)∼= X , in (1.30) to force I = X and apply both sides of (1.31) to δx. 
The state space and the algebra of observables may also be deﬁned in terms of
each other. We start with the (re)construction of states from observables, where the
following deﬁnition and proposition may leave a hybrid impression. The rationale
behind our approach is that for many purposes it is easier to work with the com-
plex algebra C(X), but on the other hand, compact convex sets are most naturally
deﬁned in terms of real vector spaces. Fortunately, it is easy to switch between the
two: we already know how to obtain the real part R(X) from C(X), see (1.23), and
conversely, C(X) is simply the complexiﬁcation of the real vector space R(X).
Deﬁnition 1.14. A state on C(X) is a linear map ω :C(X)→ C that satisﬁes:
1. ω( f 2)≥ 0 for each f ∈C(X) with f ∗ = f (positivity);
2. ω(1X ) = 1 (normalization).
The ﬁrst condition obviously comes down to ω( f )≥ 0 whenever f ≥ 0 pointwise.
Equivalently, we may deﬁne a state on R(X) as a real-linear map ωR : R(X)→R
that satisﬁes the very same conditions. Indeed, a state ωR on R(X) deﬁnes a
complex-linear map ω : C(X)→ C by ω( f + ig) = ωR( f )+ iωR(g), where f ,g ∈
R(X). This map satisﬁes the same conditions of positivity and normalization. Con-
versely, ω may be restricted to the real part R(X) of C(X), so that there is no real
(sic) difference between ω and ωR. Hence we will use these interchangeably, often
even dropping the sufﬁx R on ω . One advantage of this ability to switch is that a
state ω on C(X) may be regarded as an element of the real vector space R(X)∗.
Doing so shows that the terminology of Deﬁnitions 1.9 and 1.14 is consistent:
Theorem 1.15. There is a bijective correspondence between states ω on C(X) and
probability measures P on X, given by ω ↔ EP, cf. (1.9) and (1.11). Therefore, as
a subset of the (real) vector space R(X)∗ of all (real-) linear maps from R(X) to R,
the set S(C(X)) of all states on C(X) coincides with the set Pr(X) of all probability
measures on X. In particular, the state space S(C(X)) of C(X) is a compact convex
set in R(X)∗ (as a ﬁnite-dimensional vector space with its usual topology).
Proof. Given a state ω , deﬁne a function p : X → R by p(x) = ω(δx). Since δx ≥ 0
pointwise, positivity of ω yields p(x) ≥ 0. Noting that 1X = ∑x δx, normaliza-
tion then forces ∑x p(x) = 1, so that p is a probability distribution on X . Hence
P ∈ Pr(X), where P is the probability measure corresponding to p. Conversely,
P ∈ Pr(X) deﬁnes a map EP : R(X)→R by (1.9), which is positive and normalized.
Note that compactness and convexity of the set S(C(X)) in R(X)∗ follow directly
from its deﬁnition, i.e., even without knowing that it equals Pr(X). 
Consequently, we may refer to S(C(X)) as the state space of C(X) without any
ambiguity, and we will always regard state spaces of (unital) C*-algebras A (cf.
Appendix C) as compact convex sets S(A), where in the present case A=C(X).
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1.3 Pure states and transition probabilities
For any C*-algebra A (with unit), and hence in particular for A=C(X), elements of
the boundary ∂eS(A) are called pure states, and we call
P(A)≡ ∂eS(A) (1.32)
the pure state space of A. States that are not pure are called mixed.
Theorem 1.16. One has P(C(X))∼=X, in that the following map is an isomorphism:
X → P(C(X)), x → ωx, ωx( f ) = f (x). (1.33)
Proof. Combine Proposition 1.11 and Theorem 1.15. 
For ﬁnite X this isomorphism is merely meant as a bijection between sets (and for
general compact Hausdorff spaces X it will be a homeomorphism of topological
spaces), but we will now introduce some additional structure on pure state spaces
that will enrich Theorem 1.16 to an isomorphism of so-called sets with a transition
probability. This will be necessary in order to reconstruct the observables from the
pure states, but it also clariﬁes the general probabilistic structure of physics (note
that the following deﬁnition is unusual in probability theory!).
Deﬁnition 1.17. 1. A transition probability on a set X is a function
τ : X×X → [0,1] (1.34)
that satisﬁes τ(x,y) = 1 iff x = y and τ(x,y) = τ(y,x) (symmetry).
The simplest example of a transition probability (on any set X) is obviously
τ(x,y) = δxy. (1.35)
The point is that this transition probability may be derived from the classical C*-
algebra of observables C(X) by the following formula (assuming X ﬁnite):
δxy = inf{ f (x) | f ∈C(X),0≤ f ≤ 1X , f (y) = 1}. (1.36)
Indeed, for x = y this is a tautology, whereas for x = y the inﬁmum (which is zero)
is attained by f = δy. In terms of the pure state space P(C(X)), which is isomorphic
to but not equal to X , cf. Theorem 1.16, this formula may be written as
δxy = inf{ωx( f ) | f ∈C(X),0≤ f ≤ 1C(X),ωy( f ) = 1}. (1.37)
Furthermore (and this is the real point, so that we already have to mention it here,
ahead of a more detailed treatment in the context of quantum mechanics), the right-
hand side of (1.37) may be generalized to any ﬁnite-dimensional C*-algebra A by
τA(ω,ω ′) = inf{ω(a) | a ∈ A,0≤ a≤ 1A,ω ′(a) = 1}, (1.38)
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where ω,ω ′ ∈ P(A). Since (1.38) clearly generalizes (1.37), for A=C(X) we have
τC(X)(ωx,ωy) = δxy. (1.39)
Note that the symmetry property in Deﬁnition 1.17 is not obvious from (1.38), but
in the classical case A =C(C) it is true by computation, and the same will hold in
quantum theory. To motivate these deﬁnitions, we recall that f in (1.37), and like-
wise a in (1.38), are yes-no question to the system, so that the transition probability
τA(ω,ω ′) monitors to what extent the states ω and ω ′ may be sharply distinguished
by asking such questions. If they can, there should be some question a for which
ω ′(a) = 1 and ω(a) = 0, so that τA(ω,ω ′) (if ω = ω ′, of course). As we have seen,
in the classical case this can always be done. However, we shall see this is no longer
the case in quantum mechanics, where pure states may be thus distinguished iff they
correspond to orthogonal unit vectors in Hilbert space. Further motivation for the
expression (1.38) is post hoc, as it turns out to allow a reconstruction of the vec-
tor space of observables A, supplemented by the part of its algebraic structure that
determines its logical and probabilistic structure (viz. the ability to form squares,
a → a2) from P(A) with its associated transition probability. See Theorem C.179.
First, we develop some theory that puts both classical and quantum mechanics
into a more general setting. Notwithstanding the formal incorporation of the former,
the underlying Hilbert space thinking will be obvious throughout.
Deﬁnition 1.18. Let (X ,τ) be a set with a transition probability.
1. A subset O⊂ X is orthonormal if τ(x,y) = δxy for all x,y ∈ O.
2. A basis of a set X with a transition probability τ is an orthonormal family B⊂ X
such that for each x ∈ X one has
∑
u∈B
τ(x,u) = 1. (1.40)
A basis of a subset S ⊂ X is an orthonormal family B⊂ S such that (1.40) holds
for each x ∈ S. Relative to such a basis B of S, we deﬁne τS : X → R by
τS(x) = ∑
u∈B
τ(x,u). (1.41)
As a special case, for S = {u} we write τ{u} ≡ τu, so that
τu(x) = τ(x,u). (1.42)
3. The orthocomplement S⊥ of some subset S⊂ X is deﬁned as
S⊥ = {y ∈ X | τ(x,y) = 0∀x ∈ S}. (1.43)
4. A subset S⊂ X is orthoclosed if S⊥⊥ = S (where S⊥⊥ = (S⊥)⊥).
5. A resolution of the identity in X is a family of orthogonal orthoclosed subsets
(S j) j (i.e., τ(xi,x j) = 0 if xi ∈ Si, x j ∈ S j, and i = j), for which ∑ j τS j = 1X .
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6. An observable for the pair (X ,τ) is a bounded function f : X → R of the form
f =∑
i
ci · τyi , ci ∈ R, yi ∈ X . (1.44)
The real vector space of such observables is called ∞(X ,τ).
7. A spectral resolution of an observable f ∈ ∞(X ,τ) is a decomposition
f =∑
λ
λ · τSλ , (1.45)
where (Sλ )λ is a resolution of the identity and each λ ∈ R occurs at most once.
In the present section X is ﬁnite, whilst in the following section on quantum me-
chanics on ﬁnite-dimensional Hilbert spaces at least all bases will be ﬁnite, so that
there are no convergence issues. In general, B may be inﬁnite, in which case (1.40)
is deﬁned as the least upper bound of all ﬁnite partial sums, and all sums in Deﬁ-
nition 1.18 are deﬁned pointwise (i.e., in x). In that case, eq. (1.45) may need to be
adapted through limit constructions. Furthermore, one may worry about the basis-
dependence of τS in (1.41), but fortunately it turns out that in all sets with a transi-
tion probability that arise as pure state spaces deﬁned by C*-algebras according to
(1.38), the function τS is independent of the basis B whenever S is orthoclosed. In
that case, spectral resolutions exists and are unique, and one may turn the real vector
space ∞(X ,τ) of part 6 into a Jordan algebra by deﬁning a product ◦ through
f 2 =∑
λ
λ 2 · τSλ ; (1.46)
f ◦g = 14 (( f +g)2− ( f −g)2). (1.47)
In the classical case this yields the pointwise product (1.20), whereas in quantum
mechanics it recovers the anti-commutator. Both are examples of Jordan products
(cf. §C.25), i.e., commutative products ◦ satisfying the curious axiom (C.619).
All this trivializes if τ = τC(X) is given by (1.35), where X need not even be ﬁnite:
1. Any subset O⊂ X is orthonormal.
2. The set B= X itself is the only basis of (X ,τ), and analogously B= S.
3. The orthocomplement S⊥ is the set-theoretic complement Sc ≡ X\S.
4. Hence any subset S⊂ X is orthoclosed.
5. Any partition X =
⊔
j S j yields a resolution of the identity.
6. Any bounded function f : X → R is an observable, so that when X is ﬁnite,
∞(X ,τ) = R(X)≡C(X ,R); (1.48)
7. The spectral resolution (1.45) of f is given (analogously to operator theory) by
f = ∑
λ∈σ( f )
λ · τ f=λ , (1.49)
cf. Deﬁnition 1.1.5. In particular, spectral resolutions in (1.48) are unique.
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1.4 The logic of classical mechanics
Whatever one’s route to C(X ,R) as the algebra of observables, i.e. either as a start-
ing point or as a derived concept as in (1.48), it determines the logical structure of
classical mechanics (we here restrict ourselves to propositional logic). According to
the general scheme reviewed in §D.2, apart from the usual logical connectives ¬,
∧, ∨, and → for not, and, or, and implies, a propositional theory needs a set ΣX of
atomic propositions. These are provided by C(X ,R), and ΣX consist of all expres-
sions f ∈ Δ (we expect no confusion between this notation for both propositions in
logic and events in probability theory), where f : X →R is a function, and Δ is some
subset of R. As we shall see, f ∈ Δ is always false if Δ ∩σ( f ) = /0, so we might
as well assume that Δ ⊆ σ( f ). We write f = λ for f ∈ {λ}. From these elemen-
tary propositions, propositions are constructed inductively using the iterative rules
of propositional logic (see §D.2). This produces a set BX ≡ BΣX of propositions.
Of course, there are logical relations between our atomic propositions (and hence
between elements of BX ). For example, if Δ ⊂ Δ ′, then f ∈ Δ should imply f ∈ Δ ′.
Such relations may be formulated as axioms of some propositional theory TX de-
scribing the logic of classical mechanics. These axioms take the following form:
( f ∈ Γ )→ (g ∈ Δ) iff f−1(Γ )⊆ g−1(Δ). (1.50)
This may also be formulated through the notion of semantic entailment. For each
x ∈ X , we deﬁne a valuation Vx : ΣX →{0,1} (cf. §D.2) by
Vx( f ∈ Δ) = 1 iff f (x) ∈ Δ , (1.51)
extended to a map Vx : BX →{0,1} through the recursive use of truth tables. Deﬁn-
ing the semantic entailment relation |=X on BX by α |=X β iff Vx(α) = 1 implies
Vx(β ) = 1 for all x ∈ X , it is easy to see that α → β as deﬁned in (1.50) iff α |=X β .
In order to compute the ensuing Lindenbaum algebra LX ≡ LΣX , we note that
( f ∈ Γ )↔ (g ∈ Δ) iff f−1(Γ ) = g−1(Δ). (1.52)
Writing ∼X for ∼TX (which is the equivalence relation given by |=X , too), we ﬁnd
( f ∈ Δ)∼X (1 f−1(Δ) = 1), (1.53)
where we recall that 1A is the characteristic (or indicator) function of A. Using the
truth tables for ∧ and for ¬, we also obtain (in terms of the complement Δ c =R\Δ ):
( f ∈ Γ )∧ (g ∈ Δ)∼X (1 f−1(Γ )∩g−1(Δ) = 1); (1.54)
(¬ f ∈ Δ)∼X ( f ∈ Δ c)∼X (1 f−1(Δ c) = 1). (1.55)
Finally, the truth tables yield logical (and hence semantic) equivalences like
α ∨β ∼X ¬(¬α ∧¬β ). (1.56)
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Combining the speciﬁc and the general equivalences (1.53) - (1.56), we have:
Lemma 1.19. Any proposition in BX is logically (and semantically) equivalent (rel-
ative to X) to one of the form 1U = 1, for some event U ⊂ X. Furthermore,
(¬1U = 1)∼X (1Uc = 1); (1.57)
(1U = 1)∧ (1V = 1)∼X (1U∩V = 1); (1.58)
(1U = 1)∨ (1V = 1)∼X (1U∪V = 1). (1.59)
Theorem 1.20. The Lindenbaum algebra LX is isomorphic (as a Boolean algebra)
to the power setP(X) of X under the map ϕ : LX →P(X) induced by
ϕ([ f ∈ Δ ]X ) = f−1(Δ). (1.60)
In particular, the logical connectives ¬, ∧ and ∨ (descended to LX) turn into set-
theoretic complementation (−)c, intersection ∩, and union ∪, respectively, in that
ϕ([¬α]X ) = ϕ([α]X )c; (1.61)
ϕ([α ∧β ]X ) = ϕ([α]X )∩ϕ([β ]X ; (1.62)
ϕ([α ∨β ]X ) = ϕ([α]X )∪ϕ([β ]X ), (1.63)
and ϕ maps the partial order ≤ on LX into set-theoretic inclusion ⊆, i.e.,
[α]X ≤ [β ]X iff ϕ([α]X )⊆ ϕ([β ]X ). (1.64)
This is immediate from Lemma 1.19. Interestingly, the Boolean algebra structure
just derived as the governor of the (propositional) logic of classical mechanics may
be reformulated in terms of the Jordan algebraic structure (1.46) - (1.47) of ∞(Xτ),
or, when X is ﬁnite, of the C*-algebra of observables C(X) itself:
• EventsU ⊆X (and hence, by Theorem 1.20, logical equivalence classes of propo-
sitions) correspond bijectively to characteristic functions 1U on X , that is, with
yes-no questions (having spectrum in {0,1}). Algebraically, these are precisely
the idempotents in ∞(X ,τ), i.e., those functions e satisfying e2 = e.
• In terms of those, the partial ordering and the logical connectives are given by
e≤ f iff e◦ f = e; (1.65)
¬e = 1X − e; (1.66)
e∧ f = e◦ f ; (1.67)
e∨ f = e+ f − e◦ f . (1.68)
Indeed, in this case ◦ is pointwise multiplication (1.20). Using 1U · 1V = 1U∩V
yields (1.67), (1.65) comes down toU ⊆V iffU∩V =U , (1.66) is 1X−1U = 1Uc ,
and (1.68) follows by writing its right-hand side as 1X − (1X − e)∧ (1X − f ).
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1.5 The GNS-construction for C(X)
As a bridge from classical to quantum mechanics (as well as a good exercise), we
ﬁnally inject some Hilbert space theory into classical physics by discussing the GNS-
construction of C*-algebra theory for the special case of C(X), where X remains
ﬁnite. In general, for each state ω on a C*-algebra A, the GNS-construction canon-
ically yields a Hilbert space Hω (which is ﬁnite-dimensional for A = C(X) with
ﬁnite X) and a representation of A on Hω , in the sense of a (complex) linear map
πω : A→ B(Hω) (1.69)
that satisﬁes
πω(ab) = πω(a)πω(b); (1.70)
πω(a∗) = πω(a)∗. (1.71)
Furthermore, Hω contains a special unit vector Ωω that is cyclic for πω in that
πω(A)Ωω ≡ {πω(a)Ωω , a ∈ A}= Hω , (1.72)
at least in the relevant case where dim(Hω) < ∞; otherwise, the left-hand side is
merely dense in Hω and one needs to take the (norm) closure to obtain Hω . Further-
more, Ωω realizes the state ω as a quantum-mechanical expectation value by
ω(a) = 〈Ωω ,πω(a)Ωω〉Hω . (1.73)
Given ω ∈ S(A), the GNS-construction starts with the vector spaces
Nω = {a ∈ A | ω(a∗a) = 0}; (1.74)
Hω = A/Nω . (1.75)
Now, if b ∈ Nω and a ∈ A, then ab ∈ Nω , because of the important inequality
ω(b∗a∗ab)≤ ‖a‖2ω(b∗b). (1.76)
This is true for any C*-algebra A, but below we prove it only for our example.
Assuming (1.76) for the moment, the action of A on itself by left multiplication
descends to a well-deﬁned action on Hω , which we call πω . In other words, if bω ∈
Hω is the image of b ∈ A under the canonical projection A→ A/Nω , then
πω(a)bω = (ab)ω . (1.77)
Crucially, this vector space Hω is equipped with a canonical inner product
〈aω ,bω〉= ω(a∗b). (1.78)
Indeed, this form is well deﬁned, and is positive deﬁnite because ω is a state.
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In general, Hω as deﬁned by (1.75) with inner product (1.78) is merely a pre-
Hilbert space, which needs to be completed in the associated norm, and it takes some
effort to check that the operators deﬁned by (1.77) are bounded. In our example, on
the other hand, Hω is ﬁnite-dimensional and hence complete. In any case, it is easy
to verify the properties (1.70) - (1.73), whilst (1.72) holds with the unit 1 = 1H .
We now prove (1.76) for A=C(X). Fom Theorem 1.15 we have ω = EP, and by
(1.9) and (1.24), the inequality (1.76) comes down to the obviously correct result
∑
x
| f (x)g(x)|2 ≤ ‖ f‖2∞ ∑
x
|g(x)|2. (1.79)
Writing NEP ≡ NP, we may also check directly that if g ∈ NP and f ∈ C(X), then
f g ∈ NP. Indeed, in terms of the set supp(P)⊆ X deﬁned by
supp(P) = {x ∈ X | p(x)> 0}, (1.80)
we have
NP = { f ∈C(X) | f (x) = 0∀x ∈ supp(P)}, (1.81)
and clearly g= 0 on supp(P) implies f g= 0 on supp(P). We now compute HP and
πP. From (1.81) we have f − g ∈ NP and hence f ∼ g iff f (x) = g(x) for all x ∈
supp(P), where ∼ is the equivalence relation whose equivalence classes fP deﬁne
elements of HP =C(X)/NP. Hence fP is simply the restriction of f to supp(P), and
HP = 2(X ,P) (1.82)
is the Hilbert space that consists of these restriction, with inner product
〈 fP,gP〉= ∑
x∈supp(P)
p(x) f (x)g(x). (1.83)
The representation (1.77) then trivially gives
πP( f )gP = fPgP, (1.84)
so that πP( f ) is the multiplication operator deﬁned by f on 2(X ,P). In functional
analysis one often denotes elements gP ∈ 2(X ,P) by the functions g themselves,
and similarly writes πP( f ) as f , so that (1.84) simply reads πP( f )g= f g.
The operator norm of πP( f ) is easily computed to be
‖πP( f )‖= sup{| f (x)|,x ∈ supp(P)}= ‖ f|supp(P)‖∞. (1.85)
Indeed, the bound ‖πP( f )‖ ≤ ‖ f|supp(P)‖∞ is immediate from the deﬁnition
‖πP( f )‖= sup{‖πP( f )gP‖,gP ∈ HP,‖gP‖= 1}, (1.86)
and equality in this bound follows from applying the operator πP( f ) to the function
g= 1U , where U ⊂ X is any set where | f | attains its maximum ‖ f|supp(P)‖∞.
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Notes
§1.1. Basic constructions of probability theory
§1.2. Classical observables and states
For (advanced) treatments of convexity theory and probability theory in contexts
relevant to mathematical physics we recommend Israel (1979), Alfsen & Shultz
(2001), and Simon (2001).
§1.3. Pure states and transition probabilities
Transition probabilities (in the abstract sense meant here) were introduced by von
Neumann, but his manuscript from 1937 was only published in 1981 as von Neu-
mann (1981/1937). This remarkable paper has remained largely unused (or even un-
known) in both mathematical physics and operator algebras; Mielnik (1968), Shultz
(1982), and Landsman (1996, 1997) are exceptions. An extensive discussion with
further references may be found in Landsman (1998a).
§1.4. The logic of classical mechanics
Unless one counts Boole (1847), it seems that the logical analysis of classical
mechanics was initiated by the famous paper of Birkhoff & von Neumann (1936),
which was primarily concerned with quantum logic (cf. §2.10). Our use of semantic
implication (also in the quantum case) was inspired by Re´dei (1998).
§1.5. The GNS-construction for C(X)
See §C.12 for the GNS-construction in general.
